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Most national and international agencies producing population
projections avoid addressing explicitly the issue of uncertainty.
Typically, they provide either a single projection or a set of low,
medium and high variants1,2, and only very rarely do they give
these projections a probabilistic interpretation. Probabilistic
population projections have been developed for specific indus-
trialized countries, mostly the United States, and are based largely
on time-series analysis3. On a global level, time-series analysis is
not applicable because there is a lack of appropriate data, and for
conceptual reasons such as the structural discontinuity caused by
the demographic transition4–6. Here we report on a new probabil-
istic approach that makes use of expert opinion on trends in
fertility, mortality and migration, and on the 90 per cent uncer-
tainty range of those trends in different parts of the world. We
have used simulation techniques to derive probability distribu-
tions of population sizes and age structures for 13 regions of the
world up to the year 2100. Among other things, we find that there
is a probability of two-thirds that the world’s population will not
double in the twenty-first century.
The probabilistic projections are based on distributions for
fertility, mortality and migration in all regions, defined in terms
of high or low values assumed to cover 90 per cent of all possible
future outcomes. For today’s high-fertility countries they are based
on an assessment of their current standing in the process of
demographic transition towards low fertility7, together with infor-
mation about reproductive intentions8. These data show that even
in sub-Saharan Africa the fertility transition has started, and that it
is well advanced in most other developing regions. The high and low
assumptions for the years 2030–2035 are total fertility rates (TFR,
the number of children per woman) of 4.0 and 2.0 in Africa, central
Asia and the Middle East, 3.0 and 1.7 in southern Asia, Pacific Asia
and Latin America and 3.0 and 1.5 in Central East Asia (mostly
China).
For today’s industrialized countries the assumptions are based on
a broad survey of possible future societal changes9. The United
Nations and other institutions have assumed that fertility will
eventually recover to replacement level (TFR slightly above 2.0),
but there is little support for this view10,11. Accordingly, TFR values
of 2.1 and 1.3 for Europe and the Pacific members of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD coun-
tries) and 2.3 and 1.4 for North America have been assumed for
2030–2035.
Assumptions for mortality were set in terms of increase in life
expectancy at birth per decade. Contrary to earlier beliefs, there now
is a considerable degree of uncertainty about the future course of
mortality. In the industrialized countries this stems from the
scientific dispute of whether we are already close to a biologically
determined limit to life expectancy12,13. Accordingly, increases of 3.0
and 1.0 years have been assumed as the 90 per cent range. In the
developing countries the uncertainty is more associated with future
trends in AIDS14 and other infectious diseases and the development
of health services15. For certain regions possible problems with food
supply have also been considered16,17. Consequently in such cases the
assumed range of mortality improvement is wide, for example þ4.0
to - 2.0 years per decade in sub-Saharan Africa.
Migration is most difficult to handle because of unreliable data
and high volatility18. For this study a matrix of constant annual
interregional migration flows was assumed with the 90 per cent
ranges covering two million to zero migration gains in North
America, and 1 million to zero in Western Europe.
The projections for 13 regions (see Table 1) show that population
growth will probably be most rapid in the middle East, sub-Saharan
Africa and North Africa, with a tripling of the population by 2050
and a quadrupling by 2100 likely. Despite this rapid growth, there
will also be significant increases in the proportion above 60 years of
age. In contrast, in Eastern Europe and the European part of the
former Soviet Union, population will probably decrease over the
coming decades. By 2050 the Pacific OECD countries and Western
Europe are likely to experience little, if any, change in population
size. This stagnation or shrinkage in population size in Europe and
the Pacific OECD countries will be associated with significant
ageing of the population, with the proportion above 60 likely to
double from its current values. Even proportions well above 40 per
cent are within the 95 per cent confidence interval. These could
bring serious consequences for social security systems.
In North America, a younger age distribution, a larger inflow of
migrants, and slightly higher fertility than in Europe is likely to
result in a roughly 25 per cent increase in population by 2050.
Population ageing will occur, but will not be as dramatic as in
Europe. Latin America is likely to have a doubling of its population
and an increase in its proportion above age 60 to about 20 per cent.
By 2050, Central East Asia (mostly China) is likely to grow by
37 per cent and experience an increase in the proportion over 60
from 9 per cent to 25 per cent. Southern Asia (essentially the Indian
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Figure 1 Fractiles of the probability distribution of the future size of the world
population.
Figure 2 Fractiles of the probabiity distribution of the proportion of the world
population above 60 years of age.
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subcontinent), which still has relatively high fertility and a young
population, will probably double its population by 2050 and will be
the world’s most populous region.
The global results for population size are presented in Fig. 1; those
for the proportion above 60 years of age are shown in Fig. 2. The
median path of world population growth will increase from 5.8
billion today to 7.9 billion in 2020 and 10.0 billion in 2050. It will
reach a peak around 2070–2080, and then begin a slow decline. In
2020 the range of uncertainty of this projection will be rather
narrow (with the 95 per cent confidence interval between 7.5 billion
and 8.3 billion) because many of the people who will be alive at that
date have already been born. By 2050, the 95 per cent confidence
interval will widen to between 8.1 billion and 11.9 billion, but the
most likely 60 per cent (medium and dark shaded area in Fig. 1) still
covers a range of less than one billion. After 2050 the size of the 95
per cent confidence interval will increase substantially, with the 60
per cent confidence interval showing a much smaller rise. The
proportion of the world’s population above age 60 is likely to
increase from 9.5 per cent today to 20 per cent in 2050 to 27 per cent
by 2100. A strong increase in the proportion of elderly people is
virtually certain, with the low end of the 95 per cent confidence
interval showing almost a doubling of today’s level.
These probabilistic projections lead us to believe that the focus of
public, political and scientific concern will continue to shift from
global population growth to population ageing. M
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Methods
The probabilistic population projections are based on the multistate cohort-
component model of population projections, which applies assumed age-
specific fertility, mortality and migration rates to the age and sex distribution of
the starting population along cohort lines19,20. A group of demographers have
analysed trends in fertility, mortality and migration in different parts of the
world21. Their discussions produced a consensus about ranges in 2030–2035
that they thought would cover 90 per cent of all future paths of TFR, life
expectancy at birth, and the interregional migration matrix22. Because the
resulting distributions of assumed values turned out to be symmetric, normal
distributions were fitted to those ranges. For each of the three variables, a single
draw from a standard normal distribution determined its relative position
within its range of future values at selected dates. The values at intermediate
dates were determined by piece-wise linear interpolation. This method has
been labelled a random scenario approach to population projection23.
Experiments with less autocorrelated paths for each variable produced very
similar means and medians and minor differences in variances24.
Beyond 2030–2035, fertility was assumed to reach an average level of
between 1.7 and 2.1 children per woman by 2080, with the specific value
depending on population density in 2030 (the high the density, the lower the
fertility). The 90 per cent range around that value was set at 1.0 children. The
range for life-expectancy increases after 2030–2035 was set to 0–2.0 years per
decade. Smooth transitions of assumed future life expectancies at birth into
age-specific mortality rates were performed by transforming baseline mortality
patterns with the help of relational models25. Because separate baseline data
were needed for males and females in each region, 26 patterns were used. Age-
specific fertility rates were derived from the total fertility rates by using a fixed
relative age profile of fertility. We used a fixed relative age profile for migrants to
determine age-specific migration rates. The projections were performed in five-
year steps on populations in five-year age groups.
An unusual feature of this global projection is the explicit consideration of
possible correlations in fertility and mortality between and within regions. Four
sets of 1,000 simulations were produced, resulting from a cross-classification of
perfectly correlated/uncorrelated fertility and mortality trends across regions
and within regions. The regional results presented in Table 1 are from the set
with uncorrelated trends. The global results are based on the merged
distribution of all four sets of simulations, which make up 4,000 projections
in total.
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Table 1 Result of probabilistic projections for 13 world regions
Total population (millions) Population above age 60 (in %)
2050 2050
Region 1995 Median 2.5%* 97.5%* 1995 Median 2.5%* 97.5%*
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Africa
North Africa 162 439 309 583 5.9 13.3 9.4 19.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 558 1,605 1,085 2,316 4.7 9.2 6.9 12.8
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
East Asia
Central East Asia 1,362 1,865 1,351 2,574 9.2 24.9 17.8 34.1
Pacific Asia 447 796 579 1,047 6.8 19.4 14.4 26.5
Pacific OECD countries 147 146 117 182 19.4 39.5 31.5 48.7
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
West Asia
Central Asia 54 137 88 206 7.8 15.4 10.2 24.0
Middle East 151 515 380 692 5.4 12.5 9.1 17.3
Southern Asia 1,240 2,368 1,833 2,970 6.7 16.6 13.4 20.8
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Europe
Eastern Europe 122 110 86 141 16.7 34.0 26.7 43.4
Former Soviet Union
(European part)
238 188 144 241 16.9 34.1 26.3 44.5
Western Europe 447 471 370 584 18.6 35.0 27.5 43.9
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Latin America 477 925 707 1,177 7.6 20.4 15.8 26.4
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
North America 297 403 303 534 16.4 30.2 24.0 38.6
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Fertility, mortality and migration are assumed to be independent.
* Columns labelled 2.5% and 97.5% provide data on the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the 95 per cent confidence interval.
Nature © Macmillan Publishers Ltd 1997
14. Bongaarts, J. in The Future Population of the World. What Can We Assume Today? (ed. Lutz, W.) 170–
195 (Earthscan, London, 1996).
15. Garenne, M. in The Future Population of the World. What Can We Assume Today? (ed. Lutz, W.) 149–
169 (Earthscan, London, 1996).
16. Heilig, G. K. in The Future Population of the World. What Can We Assume Today? (ed. Lutz, W.) 196–
249 (Earthscan, London, 1996).
17. Cohen, J. E. How Many People Can the Earth Support? (Norton, New York, 1995).
18. Zlotnik, H. in The Future Population of the World. What Can We Assume Today? (ed. Lutz, W.) 299–335
(Earthscan, London, 1996).
19. Keyfitz, N. Applied Mathematical Demography (John Wiley, New York, 1977).
20. Rogers, A. Introduction to Multiregional Mathematical Demography (John Wiley, New York, 1975).
21. Lutz, W. (ed.)The Future Population of the World. What Can We Assume Today? Revised Edition.
(Earthscan, London, 1996).
22. Lutz, W. Scenario Analysis in Population Projection (Working Paper WP-95-57, International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 1995).
23. Lee, R. D. Probabilistic approaches to population forecasting, in Rethinking Population Projections
(eds Lutz, W. & Vaupel, J. W.) (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg,
Austria) (submitted 1996).
24. Lutz, W. & Scherbov, S. Sensitivity Analysis of Expert-Based Probabilisitc Population Projections in the
Case of Asutria (Working Paper, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg,
Austria, 1997).
25. Brass, W. in Biological Aspects of Demography (ed. Brass, W.) 69–110 (Taylor and Francis, London,
1971).
Acknowledgements. This work has been conducted at IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis).
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to W.L. (e-mail: lutz@iiasa. ac.at).
letters to nature
NATURE | VOL 387 | 19 JUNE 1997 805
Attentional requirements ina
‘preattentive’ feature
search task
Julian S. Joseph*, Marvin M. Chun†
& Ken Nakayama‡
* Department of Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada 89557, USA
† Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520,
USA
‡ Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02138, USA
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
It is commonly assumed that certain features are so elementary to
the visual system that they require no attentional resources to be
perceived. Such ‘preattentive’ features are traditionally identified
by visual search performance1–3, in which the reaction time for
detecting a feature difference against a set of distractor items does
not increase with the number of distractors. This suggests an
unlimited capacity for the perception of such features. We provide
evidence to the contrary, demonstrating that detection of differ-
ences in a simple feature such as orientation is severely impaired
by additionally imposing an attentionally demanding rapid serial
visual presentation task involving letter identification. The same
visual stimuli exhibit non-increasing reaction time versus set-size
functions. These results demonstrate that attention can be critical
even for the detection of so-called ‘preattentive’ features.
One basic tenet of modern vision research is that certain attri-
butes of visual stimuli can be processed and detected in parallel
across the visual field4–6. Visual attributes such as orientation1,5,6,
colour, or size differences3 have been put forth as ‘preattentively’
perceived stimulus properties, a concept introduced by Neisser4.
Perhaps owing to the emphasis on a dichotomy between ‘preatten-
tive’ and ‘attentive’ processing, it is commonly assumed that
attentional resources are not necessary for the perception of such
image properties. This dichotomy stems from a long history of
research with the visual search paradigm in which the time to detect
a target is measured as a function of the number of display items
(reviewed in ref. 3). Stimulus attributes that require focal attention
to be perceived exhibit positive slopes: reaction times increase with
increasing display size. In contrast, some search tasks show reaction
times that remain flat or even decrease slightly as the number of
items increases. Stimulus attributes leading to this behaviour, such
as stimulus orientation, are thought to be processed in parallel
across space with unlimited capacity; hence they are called ‘pre-
attentive’ features, and are sometimes thought to be perceived
without the use of attention. In the case of stimulus orientation,
this fits well with the orientation selectivity of V1 neurons7,8, which
could conceivably permit the perception of orientation differences
regardless of the attentional state.
If the perception of primitive features enjoys a special status in the
visual processing stream, avoiding any bottleneck of limited
resources, then performance in detection of a feature difference
should be unaffected when attention is diverted elsewhere. We
investigated the role of attention in the perception of ‘preattentive’
orientation features with a dual-task procedure as depicted in Fig. 1.
We used a competing task, that of reporting the identity of a single
white letter appearing in a rapidly changing stream of otherwise
black letters at fixation. This rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP)
is very demanding when presented at 12 letters s 2 1 and has been
shown to effectively consume attentional resources for periods up to
half a second9. A search array of oriented Gabor patches was
presented for 150 ms, immediately followed by 150 ms high-
contrast white-noise masks covering their locations. The lag
between the onset of the white target letter in the RSVP stream
and the onset of the orientation array was randomly varied to
examine the temporal extent of interference, if any. In the single-
task condition, subjects were instructed to ignore the letters and
report only whether an orientation ‘oddball’, a uniquely oriented
item, had been present. In the dual-task condition, subjects were
instructed to report both the white letter and whether an orienta-
tion oddball was present.
Severe impairments in performance in detecting orientation
oddballs resulted when the attentionally demanding RSVP letter
identification was additionally imposed (Fig. 2). In the condition of
performing only the single task of orientation oddball detection,
subjects performed well, averaging 94% correct. However, when
performing the dual task of letter identification and orientation
oddball detection, oddball detection accuracy was only 60 6 5% for
simultaneous letter and orientation onset (lag 0). Note that the
chance level of performance is 50% in this task. Significant degrada-
tion in performance persists for several hundred milliseconds after
the target letter’s appearance, as a result of the attentional demands
for processing the target letter9–11. For the longest lag of 667 ms,
dual-task performance recovered to the single-task level; thus the
impairment reflects the temporal dynamics of attentional load
rather than just a generic difficulty in encoding and retaining two
independent responses. The effects of condition and lag, and the
interaction between these variables were all significant (P , 0:01).
One might speculate that we observed attentional effects in the
detection performance because these stimuli are unusual in some
way and do not qualify as ‘preattentive’. Performance was quite high
when only the orientation oddball task had to be performed, but do
these stimuli exhibit the standard experimental signature of so-
called preattentive perception, specifically reaction times that do
not increase with the number of items? There was no reason to
expect otherwise, because many studies1,3 have found this for
orientation differences that are easily detected. Our stimulus dis-
play, however, was slightly different from those used in the usual
visual search task in that our search array was on for only a short
fixed duration and was masked, whereas it is more customarily
presented without a mask and for a longer duration up to the time
of the observer’s response. To remove any residual doubts, we did a
visual search reaction time experiment on visual stimuli that were
precisely the same as those used in the first experiment, the only
difference being that the number of oriented Gabor items was varied
from trial to trial. Subjects were instructed to ignore the letters and
respond correctly on the presence of a uniquely oriented item as
rapidly as possible. The letter stream was presented as well, although
